How an Empire Hypnotised Itself
Sensations of unreality are characteristic of delusional disorders in which one of the symptoms is delusion - a strongly held false belief. Due to high suggestibility, we can hijack our frontal lobe, brainwash ourselves and refuse to admit the factual reality. From the premise that reality is a social construct, the power asserts that the craftier the narrative, the more beautiful reality. There are ideological consequences in justifications of social delusions, yet the ruling elite may become aware of those only in hindsight. An arrogant belief in one’s ability to predict unforeseen circumstances may end in tragedy. The process of disintegrating these delusions starts with the unwillingness to be deceived.
Not long after the end of WW2, questions in Europe arose about the validity of all universal concepts - truth, knowledge, reality, right and wrong. Everyone felt betrayed by the Modernity and the Enlightenment. After so much pain and destruction, all the promises of prosperity and progress seemed tragically deceptive. Europeans wondered what caused Europe to lose its moral compass. Postmodernism offered an explanation – language is the only realm of knowable reality. All truth claims about the world are socially constructed. There is no single reality or ultimate truth as claimed by modernity, only the dominant discourse interpretations of what is ‘real’, ‘true’, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Many of those who survived the horrors of the war felt as if they were in a dreamlike state; still, they knew what wrongs and rights were. Everything was in slow motion as if the time had slowed down. They felt distant from their own emotions. The reality of the tragedy was still fresh, although at times it felt like it happened to someone else. These sensations of unreality are characteristic of dissociative disorders and Delusional Disorder (DD). One of the symptoms of collective DD – a shared psychotic disorder, are delusions - strongly held false beliefs.
Postmodernism hoped to reveal the forces that had led to the war. Foucault described discourse as a set of systems - a collection of statements that determine the way we speak and think about things.1 Multiple discourses circulate on different levels of society as they strengthen each other or conflict with each other. The dominant discourse, tied to structures and forces of power2, circulates through all layers of society. It shapes our perception of reality as it governs our way of thinking and feeling while promoting the ruling ideology.3 It aims to limit the reach of alternative discourses. Through its institutions, the power controls the social organisation to ensure the preservation of the socio-economic status quo. The ruling elites - powerful ruling minorities, hold the top positions in national and transnational institutions (political, financial, academic, corporate). The media clergy (e.g., corporate media, film industry) serve not only to keep our words in line but strive to control our thoughts and desires by deciding what is and is not acceptable. Postmodernists insists that our reality is a shared construct shaped by language.
Two worlds collide. Two fundamentally opposing understandings of reality - one is that language is a tool we use to interpret our reality (modernism) and the other that there is ‘nothing beyond text’4 (postmodernism).
The idea that language creates reality reinforces the belief that we can shape the world as we wish. An oversimplified interpretation of postmodernism implies that in the absence of any objective reality, power makes things come true. The problem with this understanding is that society cannot function without the shared notion of reality. So, an ideology imposes the ‘consensus’. Ideologically appropriated relativism disputes the objectivity of universal terms (e.g., truth, knowledge, reality), but it does so in a selective manner - it considers some truths or moral values superior to others. Hence, power decides what is truth, information, or reality. In his last book (Spectres of Marx, 1993), Derrida recognised a tragic abuse of postmodern relativism (ten plagues). Simplistic relativism interprets postmodernism as a denial of reality and the Self. It shares a bleak view of human agency where the social world is nothing but a monster that manipulates and absorbs resistance. Individual agency is nothing but an illusion. Implied relativism dismisses the possibility of social action. As an ideology, it commits the ‘sins of modernism’ and becomes an immoral bearer of illusions.
Postmodernism may have intended to liberate the individual and challenge the power; however, selective relativism holds rational thought, trust, and dialogue hostage. Contradictions multiply and we are left with deceptive appearances. The Power has appropriated postmodernism and the ruling elite interprets rules and reality as they see fit. The elite is keen to see themselves as exceptional, talented individuals because of their ‘economic success,’ ‘intellectual vigour’, or social status. Relativism claims to be above ideology and denies better-worse categories while asserting itself as a ‘better interpretation of the state of affairs’. To ‘sell knowledge’, yet deny the existence of knowledge is a contradiction that many in academia dismiss as they refuse to face the absurdity of that position. ‘Journalists’ refuse responsibility by commonly arguing that their job is not presenting evidence. Dominant discourse rejects the concept of truth but then raises an alarm against populism and the ‘dangerous shift from fact to fiction’. The notion of truth is revived only when it is required to keep ideological dominance alive. Neoliberal ideology virtue signals higher moral values to justify imperial wars that serve the elite’s economic interests.
The chaotic world of double standards compels us to compare what people say to what they do, so we can make more realistic judgments about their intentions. In a confused world where we create reality as we go, it seems meaningless, even nonsensical to talk about delusions. Still, we say that delusions occur when a person or a group believes in something physically impossible.
Delusions And Suggestibility
When we discuss delusions we may rely on extensive psychological research that links delusions to personality traits and attitudes (beliefs, feelings, and action tendencies). Decades-long research into addictions, related brain regions and social influences produced an extensive volume of evidence that has shown the significance of personality traits. For example, an excessive use of online communication technology impacts individuals’ social interactions, their mental and emotional states, and reduces their agency.5 Evidence also indicates that technology itself is not the cause of these problems and points towards personality traits.6 Nonetheless, this argument absolves society of any responsibility and, in a world driven by profits, blames individuals for their misfortune. What is often ignored is that personality traits, such as neuroticism, may change under certain circumstances.7 This raises the question of whether changes in personality traits can influence the perception of reality and how this may impact an individual’s behaviour.
Although human behaviour cannot be explained by underlying dispositions, such as personality traits and attitudes, it has not stopped psychologists and laypersons alike from pursuing this as a possibility for predicting behaviour. Both personality traits and attitudes (viewed as more malleable) are seen as hypothetical constructs that can only be understood from observation of behaviour and within the context.
Personality traits are described as consistent and unique enduring patterns of individuals’ behaviours, thoughts, and feelings.8 Five-Factor Theory assumes that traits are ‘essentially independent of environmental influences’. In contrast, the Social Investment Principle of Neo-Socioanalytic Theory, suggests that major life events may cause lasting personality trait change.9 Traits are organised hierarchically, with broad traits being defined by narrow facets. Big Five is one of the widely accepted representations of broad traits: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, and neuroticism/emotional instability; with each factor consisting of six facets.10 Neuroticism, with its facets of impulsivity, anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, and vulnerability, is linked to negative aspects of emotional imbalance. Namely, research in predictors of online addiction reveals a relationship between neuroticism and problematic online activity.11 An alternative model of personality – HEXACO (additional humility/honesty trait) has also been investigated in relation to behaviour addictions.12 Individuals high in neuroticism often exhibit high emotionality which impacts their mental health and socialisation.13 The Impulsive pathway (poor self-control/poor emotion regulation) is described as one of four pathways related to neuroticism.14
Ever since Eyseneck15 suggested the relationship between personality traits and specific brain regions, personality trait theorists set out to investigate the validity of this claim. Even though brain regions are immensely interconnected and social influences on personality are undeniable, the frontal lobe, involved in regulating emotional response, self-control, and planning has been identified to influence personality.16 Furthermore, those brain regions and pathways are linked to behaviour activation and emotional reward. Evidence shows that reward pathways become activated when one engages in addictive behavior. Reduced frontal functioning and higher cortisol concentrations are reported in regions linked to reward processing17 and to hypnotic suggestibility, self-control and impulsivity.18
Neuroticism and emotionality are both associated with decreased frontal lobe connectivity which influences one’s perception of reality.19 The right prefrontal cortex is crucial in belief updating, evaluating, and operation monitoring. Brain stimulation of this brain area shows an increase in hypnotisability and its impairment explains delusional episodes.20
Failure to integrate the sensory experience can result in a disrupted sense of reality. An imagined experience may fill the gaps to reinstate the coherence. We alter our memory. We try to interpret our world and bring order into chaos. One may say that there is no real distinction between the act of remembering and the act of thinking. Memories are not frozen in time. They change with us. Remembering can be thought of as an act of creative reimagination. We often remember not of what we perceive by our senses alone, but of what we feel, and when memory as such is gone, of what we tell ourselves happened. Still, this does not mean that physical reality did not occur. Language always ends in itself. We hide in cliches. We then turn to emotions in search of proof of our existence. Here, myths, artistic expressions, and religious beliefs reside, but not rational thinking. It is also a birthplace of delusions. Ideology reaches this point with the promise of releasing one from responsibility and offering refuge in cynicism. The ruling class justifies their own lack of moral values, cynicism, and their delusions by convincing us that moral values and trust in others are nonexistent.
If we admit something as existing, we must admit that something exists necessarily, then an assumption of truth and a shared reality would be one of those necessary conditions for us to function in an external world.
Imaginative Suggestibility and Ideology
We may wonder to which extent personality traits are changeable, and how this can impact our perception of reality and subsequently our behaviour. Kirsch and Braffman gave us a clue when they demonstrated how some people can alter their experience even without hypnosis with what they called nonhypnotic imaginative suggestibility.21 Gheorghiu identified Suggestibility - ‘an individual trait of personal propension to respond to suggestion’, as a personality trait related to emotionality and neuroticism.22
Imaginative suggestibility - a degree to which one succeeds in having the suggested experience, can increase one’s neuroticism and impact one’s perception of reality. As imaginative suggestibility reflects one’s responsiveness to imaginative suggestions, the ability to deeply immerse oneself in a narrative can alter one’s notion of reality. One may vividly imagine events or situations, refuse to consider contrary evidence, or hold the most outrageous beliefs due to the emotional rewards one gets each time their ‘reality’ is validated.
When we close our eyes and imagine ourselves lying on the grass on a sunny day and looking at the blue sky with fluffy clouds drifting slowly, we experience conditioned seeing.23 We may even experience conditioned sensing. There could be a smell of the ocean in the air, the warmness of sunlight on our skin, someone’s laugh in the distance, or a feeling of joy. Although qualia make our experiences unique, we all share the capacity to engage in fantasy. Imaging constitutes one form of thinking, the other one is self-talk. As children, we learn to say things aloud to adjust to a difficult task, ask for help, and learn the rules (children often repeat them aloud). From about five years of age self-talk emerges and we talk silently to ourselves due to consequences we experienced - we witness others’ distressed reactions to our words. So we keep our thoughts hidden. We separate our public from our private world.
Mass psychogenic disorder (‘Mass hysteria’) involves the spreading of symptoms among members of a cohesive group. During the Middle Ages, it was common in nunneries for young women, often forced into these convents, to exhibit a variety of behaviors usually attributed to demonic possession. In 1962 the Tanganyika laughter epidemic occurred near the village of Kinshasa in Tanzania, which affected 14 schools and over 1,000 people. A famous case of "Havana syndrome" (2016) involved some staff stationed at the US embassy in Cuba complaining of medical symptoms initially attributed to "sonic attacks". Similar symptoms were reported in following years from US government employees and their families around the globe, including in Washington DC. Research suggests the alleged symptoms were psychogenic in nature. Causes of mass psychogenic disorder are proposed to be due to an overactive mirror system24 or high neuroticism.25
Just as personal identity is to some extent shaped by ideology (e.g., compliance – internalised norms) through our actions and reactions, so are group identities. Collective narcissism is a belief held by individuals who are convinced of their in-group supremacy. They often attribute it to their ‘higher moral values’ or ‘superior’ intellectual abilities that entitle them to special recognition and privileges.26 However, that belief may contradict their other beliefs or factual reality. Cognitive dissonance refers to holding two confronting beliefs simultaneously. One of these contradictory beliefs Hannah Arendt described as a ‘combination of gullibility and cynicism as characteristic of all totalitarian societies. Individuals may believe the most outrageous lies and claim higher moral values while simultaneously denying basic human rights to others.’27 By increasing suggestibility levels, an ideology creates an atmosphere where highly impulsive and emotional individuals can persuade themselves of their moral righteousness and be distrustful of anyone who does not share their interpretation of reality. They are more likely to vividly imagine negative situations, have selective memory, and reduced rational thinking. Hannah Arendt proposed separating the ‘private sphere’ of personal experiences and intimate feelings from the ‘public sphere’, a forum for rational debate on social issues.
Most ideological suggestions are thought to be deceptive and aim to convince an individual that the world is (or was) different from the way it is (or was). Strategies of effective persuasion often start with the assumption that our dispositions – traits and attitudes, are malleable. A person may accept propaganda and internalise given norms; however, imaginative suggestibility is self-induced. Suggestibility reduces one’s ability to compare words with actions. Perception of major life events, such as traumatic experiences, can influence changes in personality traits and increase emotional responsivity. The higher neuroticism, the more fearful or angry we are. People may despise those they dislike; still, they do not demonise and dehuminise them in order to subjugate and annihilate them. But if ideologically persuaded, due to high suggestibility and emotionality, we can hijack our frontal lobe, brainwash ourselves and refuse to admit the factual reality or the consequences of our actions. We are provided with favourable identity, reality and emotional rewards. One does ‘not notice’ inconsistencies but adopts explanations that could never be verified.
To predict human behaviour, a degree of consistency in personality traits and attitudes is required. However, some theorists claim that consistency in human behaviour is more apparent than real. They assert that our actions are rarely in line with our values or beliefs but are influenced by social factors, such as social desirability. Nonetheless, cognitive dissonance creates physical arousal and tensions that need resolving. Tensions are only temporarily reduced by either changing attitudes or behaviour. We seek agreements between our beliefs, feelings, and actions to function in a world. Although the discrepancy between what people say they should do and what they do is not rare, we find safety in consistency and reduce tensions by making choices that roughly reflect our sense of self - our moral identity. What we say, think, and do is never far from our moral identity. If we do not face the detrimental consequences of chasing our illusions, at individual and collective levels, we inevitably endorse double standards and unethical actions.
Delusions in a Ruthless Empire
In psychiatric terms, delusions are defined as an individual’s fixed, strongly held beliefs dismissed by others in one’s socio-cultural group.28 These delusions are not the same as those commonly described as ‘mass delusion’. Mass delusions are related to suggestibility, not physical symptoms of illness. This distinction matters because it prevents the categorisation of ideological opponents as mentally ill individuals. However, both types of delusions involve unshakable beliefs that contradict the evidence. Despite Collective Delusional Disorders being rare, delusions themselves are highly prevalent across many neurological, psychotic, and non-psychotic disorders and even among the general population. Contemporary understanding of delusions as pathological beliefs, characterised by their irrationality, has as its core element inferential reasoning – an individual is forming relationships between items or events not experienced together.
One may argue that modernism failed to recognise the importance of the context. Our social world predefines scopes of knowledge and resistance.29 The notion of knowledge fallibility implies the limits of free will dependent on the existing knowledge-power relations. Yet, many supporters of relativism commonly reject the concept of free will for ideological reasons. The elites are aware of their class position and the need to ensure their dominance in a class-divided society. They wish to assert that the socio-economic status quo is a ‘natural state’ of the world. Popular relativist arguments hold that people act on their intuition instead of rational thinking, but they commonly fail to recognise authoritarian judgment in their own reasoning.
Members of the ruling elite reinforce each other’s delusions. Their economic interests align with their delusions, and the stories they tell to each other reinforce them. Grandiose delusional disorder, Narcissistic personality disorder, and collective narcissism all share grandiose delusion as their main symptom. This delusion provides belief-based justifications to hide power’s ulterior motives, preserve inflated self-concept (supremacy mindset), and justify immoral behaviour. Individuals affected by the cognitive fog that this delusion creates believe in their exceptionalism and that one set of rules applies to them while others are for the rest of society. Nevertheless, the ruling class is not one monolithic, unified entity. Some may be aware of their privileges, but do not necessarily grasp their limitations or biases. The elite may undergo the same process of delusion acquisition just as the rest of society. Regardless of the presented evidence, high suggestibility and the addiction-related reward system make it difficult to let go of delusions.
We are told by the dominant relativist discourse to distrust facts, as factual truth is non-existent. But what happens when many in ‘our group’ change their belief, and we are still stuck in our ‘reality’? When our moral values and expectations collude with the dominant ideology, then the suggestibility level starts to recede.
As old delusions disperse the ruling elite needs new ideological devices and seeks consensus by chasing wars to control the population’s anger. Still, they are themselves prone to high suggestibility and delusional beliefs. One may even argue that some of them suffer from democratic imbecility. Those attacked by this disease live in an imaginary world of their own construction and have no understanding of the outside world. They keep claiming to spread democracy and freedom, yet are unwilling to give up their privileges and power. Those who suffer from this delusion commonly fail to see how double standards undermine their socio-economic position. The Machiavellian ruling class preaches higher moral values and abuses utilitarian ethics to impose their dominance onto the world. They subvert their own position until they eventually lose legitimacy.
From the premise that reality is a social construct, the power asserts that the craftier the narrative, the more beautiful the reality. Of course, this ‘works’ only in a neocolonial world where the ‘Jungle’ is plundered. As an alternative emerges, the ‘Garden’s’ colonial dominance starts to wane. The Garden’s projection of a dreamlike reality contradicts the factual, tangible reality that individuals experience. All the platitudes of democracy, freedom and prosperity inevitably end in disappointments. Still, the empire's delusions of unchallenged might may continue. The factual evidence of its ‘moral values’ is evident in the remnants of its bloody wars scattered around the world. Its oligarchy displays rage because the ‘barbarians’ do not share their dream. The Garden becomes irrelevant for some and ready to trim for others.
A Hypnotised Empire - The Resolution
As a conclusion to our brief overview of delusions and related disorders, we may summarise and discuss possible interventions. Delusions can be transferred from one person (primary affected - inducer) to those around them. There could be an impairment in a particular aspect of one’s life (e.g., self-harm), especially when delusions are not confronted. A defensive attitude or angry behaviour can occur towards those who challenge the delusion(s). Delusions, just as changes in personality traits, may be linked to trauma experience. Although the treatment depends on the diagnosis, it usually consists of a complete mental status examination, urine toxicology screen, trauma intervention, separating those affected and treating them with medication - alone (antipsychotics or antidepressants) or in combination (mood stabilizers and antipsychotics).
Delusions can resolve gradually. By reducing neuroticism we lower suggestibility levels and the delusion’s strength. Furthermore, by strengthening self-control and practicing honesty and humbleness, one can reduce contradictions in thinking and improve reflection. Suggestibility is highly influenced by expectancy, motivation, fantasy proneness, and absorption – a tendency to become absorbed in imagined experiences. Directly confronting those who suffer from delusions is not advisable. A simple separation from the primary inducer usually produces results. The focus is on comparing one’s words with actions. As beliefs are associated with pre-existing schemas and cognitive biases, Cognitive Behaviour Therapy can be effective as a treatment.
However, collective delusions, such as mass psychogenic illness or ‘mass hysteria’, align with neoliberal ideology and assist the elite in remaining in power. The problem the Western elite now faces with the power-endorsed 'reality' lies in convincing others to believe in it. If they are unwilling, the Power might 'motivate' them by fear. Thus, the public distrust becomes structural and the system ends lacking legitimacy. In a world where relativism, greed and profit rule, tensions never reduce, but grow together with dissent. To control dissent, the system has to transfer psychological, social, and financial interaction to an online transparent environment. It may abandon the ideals of personal freedom, free speech, civil rights, privacy, and deny human agency in order to control collective action. Technology is employed in the name of ‘safety’ or ‘public interests’ to legislate ‘temporary’ measures to suppress speech and surveil the citizens. Still, these ‘temporary laws’ are never reversed.
Power aims to ensure the continuation of the socio-economic status quo. The elite desires to control alternative narratives and decide which knowledge, moral values, truth, and reality are acceptable. It hopes to control who has ‘freedom and democracy’ and whose opinions are illegal.
Propaganda traps individuals in ready-made thoughts (cliches) that undermine people’s autonomy and hijack learning. Still, double-thought (G. Orwell, 1949) distorts language (‘war becomes peace, freedom - slavery, ignorance – strength’) and dislocates the Western elite’s own sense of reality. The elite knows that repetition is an effective propaganda tool in shaping public opinion, but they are also susceptible to it. They believe that by closing their eyes, putting fingers in their ears, and repeating slogans into oblivion, they can make the ‘undesirable reality’ go away. They are convinced that ‘deplorables’ do not deserve to live as equal members of society. Instead of tangible reality, they collectively embrace false hope, mysticism, and delusions.
Although treatment of collective delusions may be a complex and timely endeavor, which may last decades, one may only hope that it can be resolved in a peaceful manner. Delusions sometimes dissipate like a slowly deflating balloon. However, history shows that violence is often applied to reduce the chaotic state of mind these delusions create. There are ideological consequences in justifications of social delusions, yet the ruling class may become aware of those only in hindsight. An arrogant belief in one’s ability to predict unforeseen circumstances may end in tragedy. The untrustworthy empire is exhausted by its contradictions. It is tired, desperate, and angry. Like a drug addict, it is in denial. The empire has hypnotised itself.
The process of disintegrating delusions starts with the unwillingness to be deceived (or be self-deceived). Without separating private from public life, contradictions and delusions spread. Hence, insisting on a public forum where rational arguments, skepticism and alternative views are encouraged is just a first step in containing delusions. Just as endorsing platonic absolutes had led to world war, so can abused relativism and utilitarian ethics in the hopeless attempt to maintain hegemony.
When delusions burst and nothing is left but the admittance of defeat, the only option may seem a violent ending, including self-destruction. The pressure release compels complete system restructuring. Decreasing neuroticism and suggestibility is critical, but other steps (individual and collective) may involve - reinforcing reality/fantasy boundaries, endorsing alternative narratives, making connections with others (offline), seeking consonance and strengthening knowledge, restraining the private power structure, reducing the influence of non-elected organisations and non-elected elites. Although this in itself is a colossal task, it may not be enough for the rest of the world to forgive all the horrific acts done in the name of ‘freedom and democracy’. ‘Barbarians’ may conclude that the double-standards and abuse of universal human values are untenable, just as the West once felt after WW2 ended. The world knows that the humility and honesty of Western power elites is a fiction. The Western elite is petrified and, akin to other drug addicts, is not willing to let go of delusions. The elite, who live in perpetual plausible deniability should face negative consequences for their actions.
Foucault M. (1997). The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M.S. Smith. London:Routledge. Discourse is a set of linguistic norms, a ‘collection of statements that determines the way we speak and think’.
Power, described as the capacity to exert influence and control behaviour (e.g. compliance, obedience, conformity, group division), is embedded in hierarchical structures of the power institutions. According to Foucault episteme is power. Power aims to control the mind of the subject, create and maintain norms, regulate behaviour and expectations (Foucault M. (1997). The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M.S. Smith. London: Routledge).
Ideology is understood as an interrelated set of beliefs, including consistent attitudes towards diverse issues. It is a discourse of power that serves particular socio-economic interests. Although Karl Marx uses the term in multiple ways, it links it to a system of ideas used to achieve goals in a class-divided society. It is a culture of framing dominant ideas in society to ensure and legitimise the dominance of the ruling class. (Marx, Karl and Frederick, Engels. The German Ideology Part One, with Selections from Parts Two and Three, together with Marx's Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy. New York: International Publishers, 2001). Friedrich Nietzsche structures ideology around the concept of The Will to Power (Nietzsche, F. (1968). Will to power (transl. by W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale). New York: Random House Publishers as quoted in Steinhart, E. (2000). On Nietzsche. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishers).
Derrida, Jacques. (1976). Of Grammatology, trans.G. C. Spivak, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Firth, J., Torous, J., Stubbs, B., Firth, J.A., Steiner, G.Z., Smith, L., Alvarez‐Jimenez, M., Gleeson, J., Vancampfort, D., Armitage, C.J., et al. (2019). The “online brain”: how the Internet may be changing our cognition, World Psychiatry, 18, 119–129.doi: 10.1002/wps.20617
Kayiş A.R, Satici S.A, Yilmaz M.F, Şimşek D, Ceyhan E., & Bakioğlu F. (2016). Big five-personality trait and internet addiction: A meta-analytic review. Computers in Human Behavior, 63: 35–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2016.05.012
Haehner, P., Rakhshani, A., Fassbender, I., Lucas, R. E., Donnellan, M. B., and Luhmann, M. (2022). Perception of major life events and personality trait change, European Journal of Personality. https://doi.org/10.1177/08902070221107973
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T., Jr. (2008). The Five-Factor Theory of personality. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research. (pp. 159–181). New York: Guilford Press.
Roberts, B. W., & Nickel, L. B. (2017). A critical evaluation of the Neo-Socioanalytic Model of personality. In J. Specht (Ed.), Personality development across the lifespan (pp. 157–177). Academic Press.
Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Four ways five factors are basic. Personality and individual differences, 13(6), 653-665.
Kayiş A.R, Satici S.A, Yilmaz M.F, Şimşek D, Ceyhan E., & Bakioğlu F. (2016). Big five-personality trait and internet addiction: A meta-analytic review. Computers in Human Behavior, 63, 35–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2016.05.012
Horwood, S., & Anglim, J. (2018). Personality and problematic smartphone use: A facetlevel analysis using the Five Factor Model and HEXACO frameworks. Computers in Human Behavior. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.04.013
Chun, J. W., Choi, J., Kim, J.Y., Cho, H., Ahn, K.J., Nam, J.H., … & Kim, D.J. (2017). Altered brain activity and the effect of personality traits in excessive smartphone use during facial emotion processing. Sci Rep. doi: [10.1038/s41598-017-08824-y]
Billieux, J. (2012). Problematic use of the mobile phone: A literature review and a pathways model. Current Psychiatry Reviews, 8(4), 299-307.
Eysenck, H. J., (1982). Personality genetics and behavior, New York: Praeger.
Kehoe, E.G., Toomey, J.M., Balsters, J.H., & Bokde,A.L.W. (2011). Personality modulates the effects of emotional arousal and valence on brain activition. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. doi:10.1093/scan/nsr059
Chun, J. W., Choi, J., Kim, J.Y., Cho, H., Ahn, K.J., Nam, J.H., … Kim, D.J. (2017). Altered brain activity and the effect of personality traits in excessive smartphone use during facial emotion processing. Sci Rep. doi: [10.1038/s41598-017-08824-y]
Ludwig, V. U., Stelzel, C., Krutiak, H., Prunkl, C. E., Steimke, R., Paschke, L. M., …Walter, H. (2013). Impulsivity, self-control, and hypnotic suggestibility. Consciousness and Cognition, 22(2), 637-653. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.001
Hogg, J. L. C. (2009). Impact of personality on communication: An MMPI-2 study of African American college students and their choice in the digital communications age (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Fielding Graduate University, Santa Barbara, CA.
Coltheart, M., Cox, R., Sowman, P., Morgan, H. Barnier, A., Langdon, R., … Polito, V.(2018). Belief, delusion, hypnosis, and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: A transcranial magnetic stimulation study. Cortex. 101, 234-248. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2018.01.001
Kirsch, I., & Braffman, W. (2001). Imaginative Suggestibility and Hypnotizability. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10(2), 57-61. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00115
Gheorghiu (2000), as cited in Dafinoiu, I., & Rotaru, T.S. (2010). Suggestibility as a personality trait: connections to information processing. Annals of the Al. I. Cuza University, Psychology Series, 19 (2), 23-35.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and Human Behavior, New York: Mackmillan.
Lee, Yao-Tung; Tsai, Shih-Jen (2010). "The mirror neuron system may play a role in the pathogenesis of mass hysteria". Medical Hypotheses. 74 (2): 244–245. doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2009.09.031. PMID 19815347.
Moss, P. D.; McEvedy, C. P. (26 November 1966). "An epidemic of overbreathing among schoolgirls". British Medical Journal. 1966, 2:5525 (5525): 1295–1300. doi:10.1136/bmj.2.5525.1295. PMC 1944262. PMID 5924817.
De Zavala, A., Chichocka, A., Eidelson, R. & Jayawickreme, N. (2009). Collective Narcississm and Its Social Consequences, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(6):1074-96 DOI:10.1037/a0016904
Arendt, H. (2003). Responsibility and Judgement, Jerome Kohn (ed./trans.), 5th ed., Essay Some Questions of Moral Philosophy. pp 49-66, Schocken Books, New York.
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.).
Foucault, M. (1997). The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M.S. Smith. London: Routledge.






